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Although there were some positive viewpoints from international press and academia
that the Republic of Korea (hereafter South Korea) successfully controlled the Middle East
Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) outbreak in 2015, the domestic point of view towards the
MERS response in South Korea was critical. As people in the world’s 11th largest economy,
South Koreans criticized the failure of hospitals’ initial response to the MERS index case
and the lack of a proper control strategy for secondary and tertiary cases. To contain the
MERS outbreak, South Korea implemented mainly three MERS control and intervention
strategies: quarantine and isolation system, temporary closure of schools and cancelation
of public events, and share of correct knowledge of MERS from trustworthy authorities,
such as central and local governments and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The
traveler tracking system, the health care delivery system, and the Infectious Disease
Prevention Act should be strengthened or amended. The establishment of bioethics and
adherence to the World Health Organization (WHO)'s guidelines are also recommended to
prevent possible future outbreak.
Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS), caused by
MERS coronavirus (CoV), is a severe acute respiratory illness with symptoms of fever, cough, and shortness of
breath. 1 Countries in or near the Arabian Peninsula are the
origins of MERS, and the first MERS case was reported in
Saudi Arabia in September 2012. 2 In 2015, a total of 17
countries outside of the Arabian Peninsula were infected
with MERS through travelers, and among them, the Republic of Korea (hereafter South Korea) was the country where
the most severe MERS outbreak occurred. 2
The objective of this study is to analyze the MERS epidemic in South Korea in a critical view: 1) how MERS initially imported in South Korea; 2) how the index case spread
the virus and what the consequences were; 3) what kinds of
interventions were implemented to control MERS; 4) what
lessons we learned from the MERS outbreak; and 5) what interventions would be recommended to control a future disease outbreak.

SEARCH STRATEGY
A non-systematic narrative literature review was done
through four databases (PubMed, Medline, Scopus, Web of
Science). Additionally, relevant information from Korea
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (KCDC), Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), World Health Organization (WHO), Google Scholar, and online newspapers
were manually identified. The searching strategy was as follows:
1. PubMed: “Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus”[Mesh] AND “Republic of Korea”[Mesh] AND
(“2015/05/01”[PDAT]: “2017/12/31”[PDAT]) (Results:
57 in PubMed)
2. Medline: 1. "Republic of Korea "/ or Korea /, 2. Limit
1 to yr= “2015 – Current”, 3. Middle East Respiratory
Syndrome Coronavirus/, 4. 1 and 2 and 3 (Results: 70)

3. Scopus: (TITLE-ABS-KEY (mers) AND TITLE-ABSKEY (korea)) AND PUBYEAR > 2014 (Results: 221)
4. Web of Science: TOPIC: (mers) AND TOPIC: (korea)
Timespan: 2015-2017. (Results: 184)

MERS OUTBREAK IN SOUTH KOREA
The diagnostic pathway to MERS-CoV infection requires
laboratory diagnosis through a real time reverse transcriptase PCR (rRT-PCT) or serological tests 3-4 at a tertiary general hospital, either with a referral slip from a primary or
secondary hospital or through emergency medical services.
However, detecting MERS patients in a timely manner is
challenging because symptoms of MERS-CoV infection are
non-specific and the spectrum of illness caused by MERSCoV is not firmly defined, which requires clinical judgement
from healthcare providers. 5 Thus, it is essential for hospitals to strengthen biosafety and infection prevention/control procedures, such as enhancing early detection and
prompt triage and isolating patients through strict safety
control policies, to efficiently stop transmission of MERSCoV. 5-6 The 2015 MERS outbreak in South Korea began
with a single 68-year-old patient (the index case) who often
traveled to the Middle East for his greenhouse building
business. 7 However, none of the first three hospitals diagnosed him with MERS until he visited fourth medical facility for two times, the Samsung Medical Center, to treat his
illness. 7 During this 10-day period, he ended up contacting
742 people and transmitting MERS-CoV to 28 individuals. 7
Failure to detect the index case early caused devastating
results. A total of 186 MERS-CoV cases, including 39
deaths, were reported in South Korea 8, 9, and the case fatality rate was 20.97% (39 deaths / 186 cases). The total number of quarantined individuals was 16,752 10, and the MERS
outbreak caused the loss of US$ 18 billion in gross domestic
product (GDP), equivalent to 1.31% of the annual average
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GDP. 11 To facilitate laboratory testing for MERS molecular
diagnosis during the outbreak, the Korean Society for Laboratory Medicine (KSLM) launched a MERS response task
force. 4 Nevertheless, residents of South Korea criticized the
government and hospitals harshly, saying that they failed to
detect the index case and conduct an initial epidemiologic
investigation as expeditiously as possible.

MERS CONTROL AND INTERVENTION STRATEGIES
To contain the MERS outbreak, three approaches from central and local governments, non-government organizations
(NGOs), and schools were mainly implemented as follows:

1. QUARANTINE AND ISOLATION SYSTEM
Historically, quarantine has been the cornerstone of a coordinated disease-control strategy to stop spreading infectious diseases, from the Black Death and plague to cholera
to influenza. 12 To control the MERS outbreak, the South
Korean government decided to put 16,752 people into quarantine and authorize a law with up to two-year sentences
in prison or fines of up to US$ 18,000 for violating quarantine. 10, 13 However, quarantine has always been a controversial strategy because it raises ethical, political, and
socioeconomic issues, requiring a careful balance between
public concerns and individual civil rights. 12 Quarantined
people for MERS in South Korea had persistently high levels
of anxiety and anger, even four to six months after the removal of isolation due to the lack of mental health support.
14 Voluntary quarantine at home or in an isolated area was
also strongly recommended for those who were exposed to
the disease. 15

2. CLOSING SCHOOLS TEMPORARILY AND CANCELING PUBLIC
EVENTS

Although there was no exact data to count the total number
of closed schools, it is estimated that more than 2,400
schools, including 22 universities canceled classes to protect students from the MERS outbreak. 16, 17 A joint South
Korean-WHO mission said that it was unnecessary to put
students in their homes because MERS was hospital-associated and schools were not linked to the transmission of
the virus. 17 When the school boards of Seoul and Gyeonggi province announced the extension of school closures, the
mission recommended reopening schools. 17 Many public
events, such as music or film festivals, agricultural events,
and international book fairs, were canceled or postponed.
18 Despite the WHO’s skepticism, it was obvious that temporary school closure and canceled public events prevented
any possibility of the disease spreading outside of hospitals.

3. SHARING CORRECT KNOWLEDGE FROM TRUSTWORTHY
AUTHORITIES

One online study of the risk perception of university students during the epidemic says that only half (53.5%) of
them had the essential knowledge about MERS, and trust in
mass media was positively associated with overreaction. 19
Central and local governments and NGOs tried to provide
the correct knowledge about the disease outbreak so that
people would not overreact due to mass media. NGOs in
South Korea have tough competition to receive public money. 20 Since NGOs were greatly involved in disaster management, the government supported NGO’s education and
training program for staff and volunteers who are frontrunners in the field. 21 Also, establishing NGO networks to disseminate and exchange disaster management information

was important to avoid previous mistakes. Although social
media, such as Facebook, Google+, and Twitter, would be a
good platform that could enhance the public’s response and
accelerate the detection of a disease outbreak, it could also disseminate inaccurate information causing exaggerated concerns and social panic. 19, 22 It was not timely, but
the provision of appropriate and correct public health information from central and local governments, and NGOs was
the key to have people gain the risk perception without unnecessary fear and have compliance with self-quarantine at
home.

LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
THE FUTURE OUTBREAK
From the MERS outbreak in South Korea, it is important to
learn the lessons to prevent any future outbreak. A total of
five recommendations is listed as follows:

1. TRAVELER TRACKING SYSTEM VIA INFORMATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY (ICT)
There was no system to keep track of travelers’ movements
outside of the country and to have a close contact line
among airports, medical facilities, and KCDC. KCDC should
have promoted MERS awareness thoroughly for those who
traveled to the Middle East region. South Korea’s ICT sector,
the highest valued-added among Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) nations 23, could
potentially solve this disconnected communication loop.
The leading telecom company, KT, introduced the system
to keep track of travelers’ moving routes through the big
data, location data, and roaming data from 7.3 billion mobile phones to prevent the global spread of infectious disease in real time at the United Nations (UN) Global Compact
Leaders Summit 2016. 24 Once this system is set up, there is
no need to rely on travelers’ unclear retrospective memory,
and the airports and medical facilities will be able to organically share any of the possible pathogen carriers.

2. STRENGTHENING THE HEALTH CARE DELIVERY SYSTEM
Almost all MERS cases (183 out of 186 cases) were from
nosocomial infection, both intra-hospital infection and
hospital-to-hospital transmission because South Korean
medical facilities’ patient rooms and emergency rooms
were very crowded (7, 25). In addition, hospitals had to compensate the lack of income by having more than half of
their rooms include 4+ beds per room and reducing professional health care providers. 25, 26 In consequence, the
infection routes turned out to be from the same ward patients (33.3%), visitors (26.7%), hospital workers (16.1%),
patients’ families (9.9%), and caretakers (1.8%). 14, 25, 27 Also, MERS-CoV RNA was detected in many different places
from anterooms, medical devices, and air-ventilating
equipment as well as environmental objects, such as bed
sheets, bed rails, IV fluid hangers, and X-ray devices in the
hospital. 27 A referral management system, from primary/
secondary hospitals to tertiary hospitals, needs improvements to ensure prompt, optimal care at the right time by
sharing patients’ prescription and medication data among
hospitals, so that further diagnosis can be effectively made
at the higher-level hospital. Furthermore, it is important
to review the current referral policy to the tertiary hospital and think about the strategy to disperse patients in the
emergency rooms to respond to the real emergency cases.
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3. AMENDING THE INFECTIOUS DISEASE PREVENTION ACT
Hospitals were not professional enough to deal with infection control. Since there was no obligation to share MERS
information to the public, the Samsung Medical Center refused to initially share, which exacerbated the outbreak.
28 The Infectious Disease Prevention Act of 2015 has been
amended to regulate quarantine measures more effectively:
1) the government has the legal authority to order medical
institutions to follow property quarantine measures immediately, and 2) the medical institution’s loss incurred from
property quarantine enforcement will be financially compensated by the government. 29 Through these amendments, medical institutions will not be slow to respond to or
evade their responsibility to future disease control. To make
this Act effective, the risk communication system should
be established between the government and medical stakeholders, and the compensation fund should be consolidated
as a national subsidy for medical institutions that sacrifice
private interest for the execution of property quarantine
enforcement.

4. ESTABLISHING BIOETHICS

tized, 2) the resources to address them should be mapped,
3) a system for deploying health personnel should be established, and 4) risk communication mechanisms should be
established. 31

CONCLUSIONS
The MERS outbreak in South Korea began from a single infected traveler who returned from the Arabian Peninsula.
South Korea was a defenseless state of spreading MERS, despite the fact that it is one of the most developed countries
in the world. Although 39 South Koreans died from MERS,
an intensive quarantine and isolation system, school closure, and government and NGO’s efforts could stop further
MERS transmission. These steps along with lessons learned
from MERS are expected to prevent and control a future disease outbreak.
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Between 28 August and 1 September 2017, the WHO’s Joint
External Evaluation (JEE) assessed South Korea’s capacity
to prevent, detect, and respond rapidly to the public health
emergency, aligning with the International Health Regulations (IHR) (2005). 31 South Korea has achieved most of the
sustainable capacities to manage health threats required
under the IHR, but there are still opportunities for improvement. The important factors that need to be considered are
1) the most pressing public health risks should be priori-
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